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Would MERCOSUR's Exports to the EU Profit from Trade Liberalisation?
Some General Insights and a Simulation Study for Argentina
by Felicitas Nowak-Lehmann D. and Inmaculada Martínez Zarzoso
Abstract:
In this study,  MERCOSUR's past exports to the EU under the  protectionist
environment of the period between 1988 and 1996 are examined and an attempt is
made to determine  MERCOSUR's exports' growth potential in a  liberalised EU
market. A sectoral study is considered indispensable since tariff and non-tariff trade
barriers vary strongly among sectors. The influence of the macroeconomic
environment on  MERCOSUR's exports is examined in a dynamic panel analysis. A
simulation study based on a quite comprehensive evaluation of EU trade barriers is
performed for the Argentinean case in order to evaluate the impact of EU trade
liberalisation.
JEL classification: F13   F14   C23
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1. Introduction
In late 2001 trade talks between the EU and the MERCOSUR countries have
become both more intensive and more substantive. The prospect of a possible free
trade agreement (FTA) has been especially attractive for the MERCOSUR
economies. However, their hope that these talks would proceed quickly has been
dampened in 2002 due to the economic crises in Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay.
Resulting deviations from the common external tariff (CET) weakened MERCOSUR
not only as a customs union (CU) but also as an economic bloc involved in trade
negotiations.
In this study, past and future MERCOSUR-EU export flows will  be considered.
MERCOSUR's past exports to the EU in the period from 1988 to 1996 (when many
trade restrictions were in place) will be examined and an attempt will be made to
determine MERCOSUR's exports growth potential in a  liberalised EU market. Five
countries will be investigated, the four formal members of the MERCOSUR:
Argentina (AR), Brazil (BR), Paraguay (PY) and Uruguay (UR), and Chile (CH), which
became an associated MERCOSUR country in 1996. Bolivia, which signed an
association agreement with MERCOSUR in 1995, was not sampled due to
incomplete OECD data and due to its small economic size: Chile's contribution to
MERCOSUR exports was 18.3% in 1996, whereas Bolivia's share was 1.3% in the
same year.
The sampling period for which OECD export data are used runs from 1988 to 1996.
The investigation is performed on a sectoral level (69 sectors, SITC Revision 2). The
empirical investigation is based on a dynamic panel analysis. A  sectoral study is
considered indispensable since tariff and non-tariff trade barriers vary strongly
among sectors. Besides, not all sectors are affected to a similar degree by changes
of the exchange rate and international differentials in the inflation rate, the business
cycle, and trade barriers .
A central theme in this investigation is the search for factors that impede
MERCOSUR exports to the EU and that might be influenced by MERCOSUR action.
Therefore, the empirical analysis consists of three parts: First, an analysis on the
general real exchange rate elasticity of each single sector and the dependence on
the European business cycle; Second, a rather qualitative evaluation of the extent of3
tariff and non-tariff barriers imposed by the EU and Third, a simulation of the impact
of a hypothetical EU trade liberalisation examining the Argentine case.
The paper is organised in the following way. In Section 2 recent developments in
MERCOSUR-EU trade and of trade on a multilateral level are presented. Section 3
contains an empirical study on the reaction of MERCOSUR's exports with respect to
changes in real exchange rate and EU's business cycle. The trade barriers imposed
by the EU and their importance in the respective MERCOSUR countries are
described in Section 4. In Section 5 the impact of EU trade liberalisation is simulated
for Argentinean exports to the EU. Finally, Section 6 presents an outlook and the
conclusions.
2. Recent developments in MERCOSUR-EU trade and WTO trade talks
A very recent example of North-South integration is the MERCOSUR-EU trade
agreement. Negotiations leading to this agreement started in 1995, with the signing
of an Interregional Framework Agreement aimed at fostering economic co-operation
and closer trade relations between the two regional blocs. A further objective was the
creation of a Free Trade Agreement in 2005.
Until June 2001, the exchanges that developed in the agreement framework
consisted in gathering information and in laying the grounds for future negotiations.
Concrete negotiations only began in the second half of 2001, when questions related
to tariffs and services started to be discussed.
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay signed the MERCOSUR agreement in
1991 and it went into effect in 1995 becoming a Customs Union. Following the entry
into force of the Common External Tariff (CET) on January 1, 1995, the MERCOSUR
countries must maintain a common commercial policy. Bolivia and Chile are
associated countries of MERCOSUR without full membership status. Bolivia and
Chile signed the association agreements with MERCOSUR in 1995 and 1996,
respectively.  MERCOSUR has also  been trying to  promote Chile's
1 full membership
                                        
1 However, the MERCOSUR countries took offence at Chile's sudden disinterest in full membership at
the end of 2000 and at her bilateral negotiations with the U.S.A. about a FTA.  Cardoso, Brazil's
president and  MERCOSUR's chairman at that time, finally suspended further talks with Chile in
December 2000.4
and inclusion into the MERCOSUR-customs union in 2000. A point of concern for
Chile was the fact that Chile's import tariffs were much lower than  MERCOSUR's
average external tariff. Chile's average import tariff is 9 per cent (to be lowered to 6
per cent in 2003) and MERCOSUR's common external tariff is 13% (Lateinamerika
Jahrbuch 2001, 2001).
MERCOSUR is considered as an emerging market offering good investment
opportunities, with a population over two hundred million people (it represents half of
the population of Latin America and Caribbean). In 1998 the EU accounted for some
33% of MERCOSUR's imports and 39% of its exports. The EU currently imports five
times more from MERCOSUR than the US, making it the group's main trading
partner. Trade in goods between EU and MERCOSUR has risen considerably in
recent  years,  with the total  value of  trade flows  between the two  blocs rising  from
€ 18.8 billion  in 1990 to € 42.5 billion in 1998, an increase of almost 125%
(European Commission, 2002).
On the side of the EU, incentives to engage in substantive negotiations with
MERCOSUR will depend closely on the consolidation and progress of MERCOSUR
as a Customs Union. Due to the crisis in Brazil which resulted in a devaluation of the
real in 1999, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay sought exceptions from the common
external tariff (MERCOSUR Report, 2001). This development not only weakened
MERCOSUR as a Customs Union but will also have a negative effect on future
negotiations. Especially the present crisis in Argentina
2, which led to even more
exceptions from the CET, has left doubts regarding the stability of MERCOSUR as a
Customs Union and the solvency of Argentinean importers.
On the side of MERCOSUR, market access, trade expansion, international
bargaining and credibility considerations are incentives playing a major role to
engage in FTA negotiations with the EU. MERCOSUR has probably more to gain by
joining the EU in a FTA rather than negotiating with North America, since
MERCOSUR member countries already have relatively free access to the North
American market. A FTA with the EU, in contrast, will improve access to that market
and reduce its dependency on the U.S.A. (Panagariya, 1996). Since MERCOSUR's
                                        
2 The imminent crisis in Argentina in the period of 1999 to 2001 finally turned into an economic
disaster at the end of 2001. Banks were first closed and then reopened, but a ' corralito' (bank
withdrawal restriction of US$ 400 per month) was imposed. A painful devaluation of the Argentinean
peso accompanied these developments in 2002.5
bargaining power and credibility might have diminished due to the latest
developments in MERCOSUR countries, market access and trade expansion will be
more difficult to obtain in the future. Bilateral negotiations might become an
alternative strategy for economically sounder and stronger MERCOSUR countries,
such as Chile. Chile seems to pursue this more 'bilateral' strategy. In 2002 it reached
FTAs with the EU, South Korea and the U. S. A. It is now pushing for a bilateral trade
agreement with Japan.
From a political point of view the main questions are First, whether the EU is still
willing to negotiate with a rather unstable Customs Union and Second, whether the
EU will make major concessions in agricultural trade. These issues are of utmost
economic importance for the MERCOSUR countries since agriculture and fishery
make up about 2/5 of MERCOSUR's total exports to the EU
3 (Nunnenkamp, 2001).
Tough negotiations are to be expected for agricultural products (sugar, cereals, milk,
and meat), for textiles and for leather products, as well as for industrial products
(steel, ferroalloys, aluminium and other metals, fertilisers, chemicals, potash, plastics,
PVC and synthetic rubber).
Against this background there is concern on whether and how the EU implemented
the Uruguay Round agreements since 1995 at the WTO level. The answer might be
found in several articles of Finger (2001a,b,c,d), Finger and  Nogués (2001), and
Adhikari (2002), who take a close look at the outcome, of the Uruguay Round and in
the latest available WTO Trade Policy Review of the EU (2000).
According to Finger and Nogués (2001), the Uruguay Round commitments created a
considerable amount of slippage on the EU side due to the way they were formulated
(some were legal commitments, others were not). This view is confirmed by WTO's
Trade Policy Review on the EU of 2000, which admits that the EU was implementing
the Uruguay Round commitments on schedule
4, although the extent of actual trade
liberalisation must be judged as modest. Today's external trade regime of the EU still
contains many trade impediments especially in agriculture and textiles and clothing.
Against these quite meagre Uruguay Round achievements, LDCs asked for existing
agreements (such as the Uruguay Round Agreements) with their promises for
agricultural goods and textiles and clothing to be thoroughly reviewed, before any
                                        
3 The MERCOSUR countries have a dominant net export position as far as agricultural trade is
concerned. They dominate temperate export products (Valdés, 2002).
4 The implementation period runs from July 1995 to July 2000.6
discussions are opened on any further issues in new trade rounds. There are
provisions for reviews in many of the existing agreements but so far none have been
carried out (Christian Aid, 2001).
3. MERCOSUR's exports and the macroeconomic environment
Before turning to externally imposed trade barriers and their impact on
MERCOSUR's exports, the importance of the macroeconomic environment for
MERCOSUR's exports will be investigated. MERCOSUR'S exports demanded by the
EU are  analysed on a  sectoral level. Emphasis is placed on the role played by
relative prices (i.e. the influence of the exchange rate policy and the development of
price levels in the MERCOSUR countries and the EU) and the business cycle in the
EU. In this section changes in trade policy are treated as 'non-existent' since in the
period under study there were no remarkable changes in that respect.
5 The potential
impact of cuts in tariffs and subsidies, i.e. the impact of trade  liberalisation, will be
analysed in Section 5.
According to Figure 1 the MERCOSUR countries, with the exception of Brazil;
experienced considerable  appreciations
6 of their real exchange rates ( er_areu,
er_cheu,  er_pyeu,  er_ureu) in relation to the EU. The trend toward appreciation
began in 1989 as far as Argentina is concerned and in 1990 as far as Chile,
Paraguay and Uruguay are concerned.
The objective of the following country-regressions across sectors and across time is
to investigate two relevant issues. First, whether this real appreciation harmed the
exports of specific countries and sectors or whether a different exchange rate policy
would have helped to promote  MERCOSUR's exports. Second, how dependent
MERCOSUR's exports were on  EU's business cycle. Essential for this train of
thought is the assumption that observed  sectoral exports are an acceptable
approximation of export demand and that observed or realised exports are adequate
export indicators when determinants of the export trend are to be investigated.
                                        
5 Stepwise cuts in tariffs and subsidies were decided from 1995 on. Transition phases of 6 years/10
years were granted for DCs' agricultural/textiles and clothing products. However, there were no legal
obligations to enforce this agreement.
6 The authors use the price notation of the exchange rate. A fall of the exchange rate stands for an
appreciation.7
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The model to evaluate the macroeconomic impact, i. e. the impact of the real
exchange rate and the business cycle of the importing countries (EU) on export
demand, is based on Goldstein and Khan (1978). It assumes imperfect substitution
between domestic and foreign products (Francois and Reinert (1997). The model is
first linearised by taking logarithms and then made dynamic by building in reaction
lags, which are shaped as a geometric lag/Koyck lag with respect to the real
exchange rate ( Nowak-Lehmann D., 1997). This way, the impact of the real
exchange rate in the more distant past is less than that of the real exchange rate in
more recent years. As far as the series is concerned, we have a problem with the
time series properties of our variables in this macroeconomic set-up. The variables
are usually non-stationary (I(1)). However, if the variables are cointegrated, a model
of the following form can be estimated
7:
(1)  lxit = a + b 0
0 l lerit + b 0
1 l leri,t-1 +   + b 0
k l leri,t-k + glymeuit + uit
with
i = export sectors (i = 00,......., 97)
8, t = time (annual data; t = 1988, ...., 1996); lx =
exports to the EU in logs
9, ler = real exchange rate in logs
10, lymeu = real income of
the EU (trade weighted)
11 and  b k = b 0
k l which attributes less importance to changes
of the real exchange rate in the more distant past .
k l stands for the weight of lag
period k and decreases with increasing lag length and  1 0 p pl . uit is the disturbance
term which is IID»(0; 
2
u s ).
Estimation would be rather difficult in equation (1) given that (1) is not linear in the
b k's. To make  the model linear  in its parameters  we put the base equilibrium model
(without geometric lags) in its partial adjustment version (see Greene, 2000). We
obtain the following equations which are now intrinsically linear regarding their
                                        
7 The authors tested for non-stationarity of total exports and the other variables in the regression in the
period of 1961 to 1996 given that the time span of our panel data (1988-1996) was too short to do
reliable unit root tests. All variables turned out to be I(1), but cointegrated, i.e. in long-run equilibrium.
This result was assumed to hold also for the panel data.
8 A maximum of 67 sectors appeared as export sectors.
9 Sectoral export deflators were not available.
10 It is assumed for the period of 1988 to 1996 that tariffs and subsidies did not change and therefore
changes in the real effective exchange rate are totally due to changes in the real exchange rate ( see
WTO TRADE POLICY REVIEW of the EU, 1995).
11 To keep the analysis simple this variable was assumed to be the same for each MERCOSUR
country.9
parameters. The partial adjustment model for the MERCOSUR countries (five panel
analyses were performed) is of the following form
Argentina:
(2)  lxarit = a' + b 'lerarit + g'lymeuit + llxari,t-1 + vit
Brazil:
(3)  lxbrit = a' + b 'lerbrit + g'lymeuit + llxbri,t-1+ vit
Chile:
(4)  lxchit = a'+ b 'lerchit + g 'lymeuit + llxchi,t-1 + vit
Paraguay:
(5)  lxpyit = a'+ b 'lerpyit + g 'lymeuit + llxpyi,t-1 + vit
Uruguay:
(6)  lxurit = a'+ b 'lerurit + g'lymeuit + l*lxuri,t-1 + vit
with vit = (1-l)uit = (1-l) ( + mi it u ).  l is incorporated ina', b ' and  g'
12.  i m  denotes
the unobservable individual effect and  it u denotes the remainder disturbance where
i m »IID (0; 
2
m s ) and  it u » IID (0; 
2
u s ) are independent of each other and among
themselves.
In a pure time analysis framework the parameters of this model (eq. (2)-(6)) can be
estimated consistently and efficiently by standard techniques (OLS) according to
Greene (2000).
In a panel analysis framework GMM estimation is recommended since things around
the error term get more complicated (Baltagi, 2002; Verbeek, 2000). This is because
the lagged dependent variable is correlated with  i m  and therefore correlated with  vit
(this effect, however, will cancel out in a fixed effect model.
13), and because the
lagged dependent variable is correlated with  . i u  through  1 - u t , i . With few observations
over time this correlation may create an estimation bias. We do not apply GMM, but
OLS instead for the following reasons: First, time-invariant disturbances quite often
play the role of 'catch all' variables. If they really are of economic relevance, then
clearly separate regressions will have to be run for each important time-invariant
characteristic (subgroup). Concerning, the correlation with  . i u , it has to be kept in
                                        
12 a’= a (1-l), b’= b0(1-l) and g’=g(1-2).
13 Compare Baltagi (2002, p. 13).10
mind that the correlation bias also depends on  l, and if  l is small, the bias gets
smaller. Third, GMM estimators in our case were not able to deal with cross-section
invariant variables such as  lymeu.
14  Forthly, GMM estimators carry also a
bias/efficiency trade-off depending on the number of moment conditions used
(Baltagi, 2002).
The basic model (eq. (2) to (5)) with a common intercept and a common coefficient of
the adjustment lag was estimated in two versions: version 1 with a common
coefficient on the Mercosur-EU real exchange rate and a sector-specific coefficient
on EU's business cycle and version 2, with a common coefficient on EU's real income
and a sector-specific coefficient of the real exchange rate. The common coefficients
on the above-mentioned variables are supposed to reflect the average business
cycle and real exchange rate elasticity.
Table 1, which  summarises the results of the pooled analysis regressions for each
country, reveals that the assumption of adjustment lags was important for four
countries (with the exception of Paraguay). The adjustment coefficients carried the
expected right sign and were significant at  % 1 = a  for Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and
significant at  % 5 = a  for Chile. The model has good explanatory power for all
countries under study. R
2 adjusted was between 81.1 and 94.1. The number of
sectors investigated varies in each country, since some countries, especially the
smaller countries, do not export in all categories. 
15
Table 1 shows also that four countries (with exception of Brazil) dispose of a
significant positive real exchange rate elasticity (taking the average of 56 to 68
sectors). The majority of sectors in Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay and about half
of the sectors in Chile display a significantly positive reaction with respect to changes
in the real exchange rate. This means that in these countries appreciations of the real
exchange rate hurt the export sectors and  depreciations of the real exchange rate
could improve the export performance. Therefore, one can conclude that exchange
rate policy in these countries could contribute to a better export performance.
                                        
14 According to own estimates GMM estimators seem to be more sensitive to less variability in the
data than Pooled Least Squares estimators.
15 The detailed regression output is available from the authors upon request.11




















































































































                                        
ƒ *** = confidence level of 99%; ** = confidence level of 95%; * = confidence level of 90%12
As far as reactions of the business cycle are concerned, only three out of five
countries seem to be dependent on the economic business cycle in the EU. This
might be due to the high proportion of agricultural products in MERCOSUR exports.
Agricultural or agriculture-based exports are known to be income inelastic.
To sum up, the performance of MERCOSUR exports is dependent on a competitive
real exchange rate. A shift towards an increased processing of agricultural goods and
towards the production of manufactured goods
16 could strengthen the overall income-
elasticity of MERCOSUR exports and allow profiting from growth in the industrial
countries.
This leads to the issue of whether other factors, i.e. external conditions, such as EU's
trade policy, impede the growth of MERCOSUR exports and whether improvement of
market access to the EU countries should be given a high priority in MERCOSUR-EU
trade negotiations.
4. Extent and importance of trade barriers imposed on MERCOSUR exports
According to Supper (2001) the EU provides export subsidies and support on a large
scale to its agricultural and livestock producers, as well as its food industry. Export
refunds amounted to US$ 5.5 billion in 1997. The main beneficiary is the livestock
and dairy sector with 80 per cent of the total. Considerable export subsidies are also
granted to cereals (US$ 620 million) and food industry products (US$ 650 million).
Even though the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in
principle prohibits industrial export subsidies, which are contingent on export
performance, similar  programmes intended to promote exports continue to play a
significant role in developed countries. According to OECD estimates, its member
states spend US$ 7.3 billion on such programmes (Supper, 2001).
                                        
16 Martínez-Zarzoso and  Nowak-Lehmann D. (2002) report some progress on this process.  Linder
products increased their importance to the detriment of Hechscher-Ohlin products in the period of
1988 to 1996.13
4.1 EU most protected sectors
Not all sectors are affected by EU protection in the same way. In general, protection
against agricultural products is much more pronounced than protection against
manufactured goods. Table 2 lists the sectors or products which face very high or
high non-tariff protection (column 3) and considerable tariff protection (column 4)
from the side of EU.
17
Table 2: EU most protected sectors
Cl Sectors affected by protection Degree of
non-tariff
protection
Degree of tariff  protection
(t=tariff)
ƒ
00 Live animals chiefly for food Very high t=18%
01 Meat and meat preparations Very high t=51%
02 Dairy products Very high t=52%
03 Fish, crustaceans, molluscs,
preparations thereof
High t=12%
04 Cereals and cereal preparations Very high t=62%
05 Vegetables and fruit Very high Price dependent seasonal tariffs
On average t=12%
06 Sugar, sugar preparations and
honey
Very high t=31%
07 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices High t=7%
08 Feeding stuff for animals High t=37%
09 Miscellaneous edible products and
preparations
Very high t=25%
11 Beverages, fruit juices High Price dependent tariffs;
Average t=25%
12 Tobacco and tobacco manufactures Low t=46%
22 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruit High t=3%
25 Pulp and waste paper High
26 Textile fibres and their waste Very high t=12%
32 Coal, coke and briquettes High
42 Vegetable oils and fats High t=25%
51 Organic chemicals High
                                        
17 The sectors not mentioned show only low or no protection.
ƒ An empty cell does not necessarily imply that tariffs are zero. A blank stands for very low tariffs.
According to WTO's Trade Policy Review of the EU (2000) EU's average tariff for non-agricultural
goods stood at 4.2% in 1999.14
56 Fertilisers, manufactured High
59 Chemical materials and products High
61 Leather, leather manufactures High
63 Cork and wood manufactures
(excluding furniture)
High
65 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up
articles, related products
Very high t=11%
67 Iron and steel High
68 Non-ferrous metals High
69 Manufactures of metal High
75 Office machines&automatic data... High
76 Telecommunications&sound High
78 Road vehicles High
83 Travel goods, handbags High
84 Articles of apparel, clothing acc. High
85 Footwear High
Determination of the degree of protection is fact-based, but must contain subjective
elements. This is so because protection is not only achieved by the imposition of
import tariffs
18, but to a very large extent also by non-tariff measures (NTBs)
19. Due
to the existence and sometimes dominance of a multitude of non-tariff barriers, a
weighting scheme based on UNCTAD-information on NTBs (Supper, 2001) had to be
created. The information on tariffs comes from two sources. One is the UNCTAD
report written by Supper (2001); the other is WTO's Trade Policy Review of the EU of
1995, 1997 and 2000.
4.2 MERCOSUR's export sectors and EU trade protectionism
After having identified the sectors most affected by EU protectionism, it must be
clarified whether these sectors are of relevance in  MERCOSUR's export trade and
                                        
18 Import tariffs could be ranked easily.
19 NTBs cannot be quantified in a satisfying way because of a lack of information on their US$ or
Euro amount concerning total trade and even sparser information on NTBs affecting MERCOSUR
trade.15
for MERCOSUR's economic development. We consider export sectors important if
they are large (i.e. if they dispose of a high export share) and/or if they are
characterised by high annual growth rates. Export shares and growth rates in Tables
3, 4 and 5 follow our own calculations. In order to avoid swings that distort the
picture, averages were computed for the period of 1988/89 to 1996. The following
two Tables contain an overview of the eight most dynamic or fastest growing sectors
(Table 3) and the eight biggest export sectors (Table 4) in the MERCOSUR
countries
20.
However, these figures should be viewed with caution: A sector with a high export
share could be of relatively high national importance  and relative competitive
strength. This strength might be the result of favourable resource endowment and
might therefore be an indicator of comparative advantage (in the absence of policy).
However, strength might well follow from the rational build-up of competitive strength
by means of a whole set of policies (devaluation policy, industrial and technology
policy, regional policy etc.). Interpretations of dynamic growth must be carefully done
for similar reasons. Sector-specific industrial and technological policies might be the
cause of above-average growth. But, a very low starting level might be another cause
of above-average growth rates.
Table 3 : MERCOSUR's fastest growing exporting sectors and their
contribution to total exports (1988/9-96)







32 Coal, coke and briquettes 97.06% 0.01% high
81 Sanitary, plumbing,... 61.94% 0.01% low
33 Petroleum, petroleum products 60.44% 0.46% low
23 Crude rubber 53.47% 0.07% low
73 Metal working machinery 44.38% 0.13% low
82 Furniture and parts thereof 40.07% 0.47% low
57 Explosives and pyrotechnic prod. 38.16% 0.00% low
11 Beverages 35.94% 0.28% high
                                        
20 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay.16
Table 3 shows that the most dynamic sectors have very low export shares, all of
them lying between 0 and 1 per cent. It also indicates that low protection from the
side of the EU accelerates the growth of exports. The fastest growing sectors are in
general those involving agricultural products.
Table 4 lists MERCOSUR sectors with the highest export shares. The majority of
large sectors is to be found in the categories 'agriculture, forestry, fishery', 'textiles'
and 'metals' that are subject to high or even very high protection from the side of the
EU. They belong to the category of Heckscher-Ohlin products the trade of which is
explained by differentials in the resource endowment (labour, capital, human capital,
natural resources). Traditional trade theory would assume a comparative advantage
for the products in Table 4. Strategic trade policy or exchange rate management, in
contrast, do not seem to be the causal factors of the observed export strength.
Table 4: MERCOSUR's biggest sectors and their dynamics (1988/9-1996)








08 feeding stuff for animals 14.40% 1.17% high
05 vegetables and fruit 8.98% 4.47% very high
28 metalliferrous ores ... 8.96% 9.67% low
68 non-ferrous metals 8.08% 1.13% high
22 oil seeds and oleaginous
fruit
7.63% -0.87% high







However, it is quite difficult to evaluate the growth performance of these sectors.
From Table 5 it is clear that the average annual growth rates are significantly
different in the categories: 'very high', 'high' and 'low' EU-protection. The average
growth rate of the low protection sectors amounts to 17.09 per cent, whereas the
growth rates of high and very high protection sectors are at 7.10 and 2.65 per cent,
respectively. It should be borne in mind that these figures are not weighted by export
shares, but they still shed light on the broad picture.17
Table 5: MERCOSUR's export growth rates in different categories of protection











Live animals chiefly for food
Meat and meat preparations
Dairy products and birds' eggs
Cereals and cereal preparations
Vegetables and fruit
Sugar, sugar preparations and honey
Miscellaneous edible products
Textile fibres and their wastes
































Fish, crustaceans, molluscs, preparations
thereof
Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices
Feeding stuff for animals
Beverages
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruit
Pulp and waste paper
Coal, coke and briquettes
Fixed vegetable oils and fats
Organic chemicals
Fertilisers, manufactured
Chemical materials and products
Leather, leather manufactures
Cork and wood manufactures (excluding
furniture)






























Travel goods, handbags and similar containers


































Tobacco and tobacco manufactures
Hides, skins and furskins
Crude rubber
Cork and wood
Crude fertilisers and crude materials
Metalliferrous ores and metal scrap
Crude animal and vegetable materials
Petroleum, petroleum products
Animal oils and fats
Animal-vegetable oils-fats, processed...
Inorganic chemicals
Dyeing, tanning and colouring materials
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products
Essential oils&perfume materials
Explosives and pyrotechnic products
Artificial resins, plastic materials
Rubber manufactures
Non-metallic mineral manufactures
Power generating machinery and equipment





Sanitary, plumbing, heating+lighting fixtures




































Photographic apparatus, optical goods, ...
Miscellaneous manufactured articles
Postal packages not classified accord. to kind
Special transactions not classified accord. to ..
Animals, live, zoo animals, dogs, cats









Tables 5 and 4 suggest that  MERCOSUR's largest export sectors suffer most in
terms of growth from EU protection. In the following section, the quantitative impact
of EU protection on MERCOSUR exports shall be analysed.
5. The impact of trade liberalisation on MERCOSUR's exports
The impact of trade  liberalisation (from the side of the EU)
21 on  MERCOSUR's
exports will be quantified via a simulation study. Emphasis is laid on simulating the
effects of protection (in terms of forgone exports) on MERCOSUR's 'most highly' and
'highly' affected sectors  since only these product categories might significantly profit
from free trade with the EU.
5.1 Assumptions underlying the simulation study
•  In this study it is assumed that changes in EU's trade policy can be totally captured
in the relative prices between the MERCOSUR and the EU. According to this
assumption  EU's trade  liberalisation would be reflected in an improvement of
MERCOSUR's price competitiveness. Competitiveness in product quality is not
considered in this study.
22
                                        
21 During the 5
th Round of negotiations between the MERCOSUR and the EU (held in Montevideo
from 2-6 July 2001) the European Union unilaterally presented to MERCOSUR the Tariff Offer and
negotiation texts for goods, services and government procurement.
22 Price competitiveness has priority for MERCOSUR's rather homogeneous export products that face
very high or high EU protection.20
•  Furthermore,  liberalisation is assumed to be perfect and comprehensive: Thus,
tariff liberalisation brings  EU's tariffs down to zero (stage 1 of trade  liberalisation,
scenario 1) and additional abolition of non-tariff barriers brings EU's subsidies down
to zero (stage 2 of trade liberalisation, scenario 2).
•  In the simulation that will be run, the actual price effect of non-tariff barriers is
assumed to correspond to a subsidy of 20 per cent in 'very high protection' sectors
and of 10 per cent in 'high protection' sectors.
•  In the simulation study, price competitiveness is represented by the real effective
exchange rate between MERCOSUR and the EU. The real effective exchange rate is
determined by the nominal exchange rate (e), the price level in the EU as measured
by the GDP deflator (PEU), and the price level in the MERCOSUR countries, also
measured by the GDP deflator (PMERCOSUR). Also, subsidies in per cent (s) and the
degree of tariff protection in per cent (t) imposed by the EU enter the formula of the
real effective exchange rate. The term is computed on a trade weighted basis, (i.e.
the export trade weights of the MERCOSUR countries stand for the importance of
trade links with the respective EU countries). Increases in e, PEU and decreases in s,
t and PMERCOSUR are reflected in MERCOSUR's improved price competitiveness (see
formulas in section 5.2.1).
5.2 The simulation procedure
The simulation study relies on a partial equilibrium analysis ( Francois and Hall,
1997). This has several reasons: First, general equilibrium analyses are very hard to
perform when many sectors are involved. EU protection concerns 32 sectors out of
67 sectors (in the case of Argentina). Second, the majority of these sectors have only
weak forward and backward linkages. An exception could be the food and the
furniture industry.
The simulation study proceeds in three steps.
Step 1: A dynamic model is built which explains actual sectoral exports given existing
EU trade barriers. The estimation results thereof are presented in section 5.2.1
(Table 6a and 6b).
Step 2: Real effective exchange rates under the scenario of trade reform 'stage 1'
(scenario 1) and the scenario of trade reform 'stage 2' (scenario 2) enter the21
simulation based on the 'step 1' results. Forecast (=simulated) exports are computed
for each year (1988 to 1996).
Step 3: Average export values are computed for observed and simulated exports for
the period of 1988 to 1996. The impact of trade liberalisation is calculated in per cent.
The simulation results can be found in tables 7a and 7b.
5.2.1 Determinants of actual export demand and estimation of actual
coefficients
Actual export demand in step 1 (LX) is determined by the business cycle (real
income) of the EU (LYMEU) and the actual sector-specific real effective exchange
rate (LEERVH and LEERH). It is further assumed that adjustments to changes in real
income and real effective exchange rates are imperfect and slow, thus suggesting a
partial adjustment model (in analogy to the partial adjustment model in section 3).
Only the Argentinean case is presented and OECD trade data for the period of 1988
to 1996 are used.
Table 6a: The impact of the actual real effective exchange rate in 'very high'
protection sectors
23
Method: Pooled Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1989 1996
Included observations: 8 after adjusting endpoints
Number of cross-sections used: 9
Total panel (balanced) observations: 72
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.
C -83.69215 -1.574228 0.1207
LYMEU 3.688820 1.618725 0.1108
LXAREU?(-1) 0.594611 5.447924 0.0000
LEERVHAR_00 0.661516 1.782765 0.0797
LEERVHAR_01 1.220853 3.063758 0.0033
                                        
23 In Argentina 9 out of 67 sectors are affected by 'very high' EU protection. A dynamic panel analysis
is run where emphasis is put on the sector-specific impact of the real effective exchange 'LEERVHAR'.
In the 'very high' non-tariff protection sectors the real effective exchange rate is computed as:
REERVH = [ e*PEU*(1-0.2)]/[PMERCOSUR*(1+t)]  allowing for a sector-specific tariff (see table 2, last
column).22
LEERVHAR_02 0.425881 1.031865 0.3063
LEERVHAR_04 1.068050 2.680888 0.0095
LEERVHAR_05 1.106135 2.995864 0.0040
LEERVHAR_06 0.897497 2.382470 0.0204
LEERVHAR_09 0.486454 1.255407 0.2142
LEERVHAR_26 1.001246 2.737581 0.0081
LEERVHAR_65 0.83919 2.315707 0.0240
R-squared 0.970924 Prob(F-stat.) 0.00000
Adjusted R-squared 0.965593 Durbin-Watson 1.9004514
Table 6b: The impact of the actual real effective exchange rate in 'high'
protection sectors
24
Method: Pooled Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1989 1996
Included observations: 8 after adjusting endpoints
Number of cross-sections used: 23
Total panel (balanced) observations: 176
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.
C -54.75399 -1.444719 0.1506
LYMEU 2.489429 1.531781 0.1277
LXAREU?(-1) 0.512568 7.354068 0.0000
LEERHAR_03 0.921338 3.336206 0.0011
LEERHAR_07 0.521989 1.891243 0.0605
LEERHAR_08 1.110387 3.818660 0.0002
LEERHAR_11 0.637481 2.227859 0.0274
LEERHAR_22 0.964187 3.546959 0.0005
LEERHAR_25 0.673410 2.492548 0.0138
LEERHAR_32 0.307833 1.099847 0.2732
LEERHAR_42 0.789777 2.790355 0.0059
LEERHAR_51 0.677295 2.510671 0.0131
LEERHAR_56 0.047565 0.155572 0.8766
LEERHAR_59 0.500757 1.838732 0.0679
LEERHAR_61 0.849807 3.157346 0.0019
LEERHAR_63 0.298198 1.063242 0.2894
LEERHAR_64 0.428687 1.557544 0.1214
LEERHAR_67 0.690943 2.559599 0.0115
LEERHAR_68 0.659800 2.444727 0.0157
LEERHAR_69 0.634844 2.342285 0.0205
                                        
24 High EU protection affects 23 out of 67 Argentinean sectors. The sector-specific impact of the real
effective exchange rate 'LEERHAR' is estimated by means of a dynamic panel analysis. In the 'high'
protection sectors the real effective exchange rate is: REERH = [e*PEU*(1-0.1)]/[PMERCOSUR*(1+t)], also
allowing for a sector-specific tariff (see table 2, last column).23
LEERHAR_75 0.496043 1.824453 0.0701
LEERHAR_76 0.369010 1.330614 0.1853
LEERHAR_78 0.679081 2.515059 0.0130
LEERHAR_83 0.377693 1.360230 0.1758
LEERHAR_84 0.588224 2.171953 0.0314
LEERHAR_85 0.374600 1.357891 0.1765
R-squared 0.932914 Prob(F-stat.) 0.00000
Adjusted R-squared 0.921733 Durbin-Watson 2.02850
Table 6 a and b show the impact of the actual real effective exchange rate and the
business cycle on Argentinean exports. Both, in the 9 'very high' and the 23 'high'
protection sectors, the actual real effective exchange rate carries the expected
positive sign and is generally significant ( % 5 = a ). The business cycle, in contrast, is
not significant for  % 5 = a , but significant for  % 11 = a  ('very high' protection sectors),
respectively  % 13 = a  ('high' protection sectors). The adjustment coefficient carries
the expected positive sign and is significant, even for  % 0 = a .
To sum up: Since the actual real effective exchange rate is significant and positive, a
simulation study on the impact of improved price competitiveness (achieved through
trade  liberalisation) seems indicated for Argentina.
25 All sectors that are
characterised by a significant and positive price reaction can benefit from EU trade
liberalisation.
5.2.2 The impact of trade liberalisation on Argentinean exports
After having estimated the above coefficients, exports are simulated under two
scenarios. In the following tables (Tables 7a and 7b) the impact of zero tariffs
(scenario 1: trade liberalisation, 'stage 1', column 3) and zero tariff +zero subsidies
(scenario 2: trade liberalisation 'stage 2', column 4) is presented. The mean annual
increase of exports in per cent is calculated for each sector. It is expected that
complete  liberalisation with zero tariffs and zero subsidies (scenario 2) promotes
exports more than a 'simple' abolition of tariffs (scenario 1).
                                        
25 The real effective exchange rate was not sufficiently significant for many 'very high' and 'high'
protection sectors in Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay.24





(in terms of higher
level of sectoral






(in terms of higher
level of sectoral
exports in per cent
per annum)
Cl. Sector
00 Live animals 1.39% 3.19%
01 Meat&meat preparations 3.74% 5.79%
[02 Dairy products&birds' eggs 3.73% 5.48%]
04 Cereals&cereal preparations 4.36% 6.42%
05 Vegetables&fruit 0.91% 2.82%
06 Sugar, sugar preparations, honey 2.22% 4.15%
[09 Miscellaneous edible products 1.91% 3.69%]
26 Textile fibres 0.91% 2.79%
65 Textile yarn, fabrics 0.88% 2.69%
Unweighted average 2.06% 3.98%
[...]       not significant real effective exchange rate coefficients for  % 10 = a
In the 'very high' protection sectors the percentage increase of exports is around 2.06
per cent when tariffs are reduced to zero ('stage 1' trade liberalisation, column 3) and
about 3.98 per cent when both tariffs and subsidies are abolished (column 4).
Complete liberalisation has a larger impact on exports than pure tariff-liberalisation,
as expected. However, the simulation results also make clear that trade liberalisation
on the EU side has a noticeable impact on Argentinean exports. Given a real
effective exchange rate elasticity of 0.97 (computed from table 6a, significant
coefficients only), the impact of 'stage 1' trade  liberalisation corresponds to a real
depreciation of 2.12 per cent per annum and that of a 'stage 2' trade liberalisation is
equivalent to a real depreciation of 4.10 per cent per annum.25





(in terms of higher
level of sectoral






(in terms of higher
level of sectoral
exports in per cent
per annum)
Cl. Sector
03 Fish, crustaceans, molluscs,
preparations thereof
0.76% 1.53%
07 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices,
manufactures thereof
0.41% 1.01%
08 Feeding stuff for animals 2.44% 3.28%
11 Beverages 1.49% 2.21%
22 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruit 0.05% 0.82%
25 Pulp and waste paper -0.08% 0.60%
[32 Coal, coke and briquettes 0.45% 0.90%]
42 Fixed vegetable oils and fats 1.56% 2.30%
51 Organic chemicals 0.06% 0.74%
[56 Fertilisers, manufactured 0.00% 0.21%]
59 Chemical materials and products 0.11% 0.70%
61 Leather, leather manufactures -0.06% 0.68%
[63 Cork and wood manufactures 0.09% 0.56%]
[64 Paper, paperboard, articles of
paper
0.22% 0.78%]
67 Iron and steel 0.12% 0.81%
68 Non-ferrous metals 0.01% 0.67%
69 Manufactures of metal -0.05% 0.63%






78 Road vehicles -0.02% 0.67%
[83 Travel goods, handbags 0.03% 0.57%]
84 Articles of apparel&clothing
accessories
0.02% 0.65%
[85 Footwear 0.17% 0.68%]
Unweighted average 0.42% 1.11%
[...]       not significant real effective exchange rate coefficients for  % 10 = a
In the 'high' protection sectors the impact of trade  liberalisation is much less
perceptible. 'Stage 1' trade liberalisation only increases the export volume by 0.42
per cent. 'Stage 2' trade liberalisation has a slightly larger impact. It enlarges exports26
by 1.11 per cent. The impact of a 'stage 1' trade liberalisation is comparable to a real
depreciation of 0.59 per cent per annum and that of a 'stage 2' trade liberalisation is
equivalent to a 1.57 per cent real depreciation per annum when the real effective
exchange rate elasticity is 0.71 (computed from table 6b, significant coefficients
only).
In sum: Argentinian 'very high' protection sectors would perceptibly profit from trade
liberalisation. It should be added that no simulations were performed for Brazil, Chile,
Paraguay and Uruguay where simulation results would have been unreliable due to
the fact that the coefficients of real effective exchange rate were not highly significant
( % 1 = a ) in many 'very high' protection sectors.
6. Outlook and conclusions
The analyses for the period of 1988 to 1996 revealed four things: First, a more
competitive real exchange rate could improve  MERCOSUR's export performance.
Second, EU protection has had in general a very negative impact on MERCOSUR
export growth rates. The most dynamic sectors were on average  characterised by
low EU-protection. 'Low protection sectors' grew much faster than 'high protection
sectors', and 'very high protection sectors' grew the slowest. Third, EU trade
protection also had a large impact on the export level in the 'very high protection'
sectors as revealed by a simulation study for the Argentinean economy. Forthly, EU
protection strongly affected MERCOSUR sectors with the highest export shares.
These sectors are not only crucial for GDP growth, but are also the main suppliers of
foreign exchange.
To conclude, the following proposals can be made against the background of actual
outcomes of the Uruguay Round and from some of the findings revealed by the
authors' econometric investigation:
•  Some kind of exchange rate management seems to be advisable for the
MERCOSUR countries. Permanent appreciation of the real exchange rate should be
avoided. This would help export growth to some extent, depending on the specific
exchange rate elasticities.
•  The old Uruguay Round agreements of 1994 which contained several
improvements for LDCs in general and the MERCOSUR countries ( as exporters of27
agricultural products and textiles/clothing), should be reviewed with rigour and placed
again on the 'after Doha' agenda.
•  Trade talks between the MERCOSUR and the EU should be pursued but seen
from a realistic perspective. A Free Trade Agreement between the EU and
MERCOSUR that also includes sensitive goods (such as agriculture and
textiles/clothing) will be difficult to reach given the experience of the last 9 years. EU
concessions will depend on new regulations for services and intellectual property
rights from the side of MERCOSUR. These concessions might be very costly
26 for
these countries.
                                        
26 See remarks of Finger and Nogués, 2001e.28
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